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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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1. In the Chunchon area men conscripted by the interior police (Nae Mu So) were sent north in groups of 300 for training at Sunchon (125-56, 39-26) (YD-5267), Musan (129-10, 42-10) (EB-1873), and Kanggye (126-36, 40-58). Those under 35 are given military training; older men do food and supply work. In early February, it was rumored among North Korean officials in Chunchon that approximately 50 percent of these conscripts were killed en route to training areas by UN air raids, and that the conscripts are easily panicked by the appearance of UN planes and often desert the truck convoys.
2. In early February, the North Korean State Security Bureau in the area of Chunchon and northward initiated a policy of "co-responsibility." All individuals in each group of three houses are forced to inform on others in the group and to report any evidence or suspicions about anti-Communists. If one member of the group is found guilty of disloyalty, all persons are considered responsible and suffer equally. School boys under 15 years old are used to inform on those evading or opposing conscription and to inform on anti-Communists. The boys are rewarded with cash and food according to the number of such persons they are able to betray.
3. The interior police have organized a village guard in all villages once occupied by UN troops. Day and night seven or eight guards spotcheck roads and houses in the area around Chunchon. Others are stationed every 600 meters along the railroad. The guards are sheltered in lean-tos and are armed with improvised spears. The majority of the guards work unwillingly.
4. In early February, North Korean administrative offices in the Chunchon area were hindered by frequent UN air raids. The morale of both office workers and laborers is low because of the close inspection and control of the State Security Bureau. By 9 February, approximately 70 percent of the remaining inhabitants opposed North Korean policies and hoped the UN troops would reoccupy the area. Prices have generally doubled and markets have disappeared because of shortages and air raids.

BY CABLE

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5. The interior police and people's committees are forcing citizens to "contribute" all brass articles. In early February, the interior police, one-fifth of whom are armed, began to confiscate cattle and hogs in the Chunchon area to send north of the 39th Parallel. A large (undetermined) number of cattle were also slaughtered by North Koreans and Chinese Communists for immediate use. By 10 February, only a few well-hidden hogs and cattle remained in the Hongchom (127-54, 37-42) area, including Nae-myom (128-14, 37-48) (DS 3383), Tuchon-myom (128-01, 37-49) (DS 1386), and Kirin-myom (128-13, 37-50) (DS 3187).
6. Supplies to the front lines are moved by truck to the 39th Parallel, where they are transferred to carts which continue to the front on a relay basis. Supplies are moved only at night and are hidden by day from air attack. Rice found in the front areas is milled there and distributed to Communist armies or to the families of Communist officials.

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